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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND DRIVING WHILE 
INTOXICATED: 
WHEN DOES A POLICE OFFICER NEED A WARRANT? 
Marra Kassman* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Every fifty-three minutes, someone in the United States is 
killed in a drunk driving-related accident.1  In 2011 alone, 11,397 
people were killed in drunk driving accidents by drivers who had 
over a .08 blood alcohol concentration (BAC), which is the legal 
limit in the United States.2  Many drivers (at least 24% in 2011) 
refuse to perform a Breathalyzer test upon being pulled over for a 
suspected drunk driving arrest because they believe that it is an 
invasion of their right to privacy, they are innocent of the crime, or 
they simply do not want to be in trouble with the law.3  Because of 
the high rate of refusal, all fifty states have adopted implied consent 
laws, which “require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor 
vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested 
 
*Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2018; Marist College, B.A., 
in Psychology, minor in Pre-Law, 2015. I would like to thank my incredible family for all 
their support and love throughout this process.  I especially want to recognize my parents 
and my boyfriend for their constant encouragement in all aspects of my life. Finally, I would 
like to give a special thank you to Professor Seplowitz, my faculty advisor, for always 
believing in me and helping me mold this paper into what it is today, Professor Shaw for his 
insight on this topic, and to my editor, Jessica Vogele, for her assistance, advice, mentorship, 
and friendship. 
1 About Drunk Driving, MADD, http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving/about/ (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2017).  
2 Lawrence Blincoe et al., The Economic and Societal Impact of Motor Vehicle Crashes, 
2010 (Revised), NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 148 (May 2015), 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812013.  
3 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2169 (2016); See also Namuswe et al., 
Breath Test Refusal Rates in the United States-2011 Update, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 2014), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/Breath_Test_ 
Refusal_Rates- 811881.pdf.   
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or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.”4  
Drivers who fail to comply with an implied consent law could face 
suspension of their driver’s licenses.5  The issue then becomes 
whether the implied consent laws “violate the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against unreasonable searches.”6  
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects the 
right to privacy by requiring law enforcement officers to obtain 
warrants to search individuals or seize property from individuals.7    
When the Fourth Amendment was first drafted, the Founders 
could not possibly have contemplated the technological advances in 
modern law enforcement, the military, transportation, and 
communications.8  The U.S. Supreme Court recently held in 
Birchfield v. North Dakota9 that the Fourth Amendment allows police 
officers to perform breath tests without first obtaining a warrant on 
individuals suspected of Driving-While-Intoxicated (“DWI”).10  
However, the Court also held that the Fourth Amendment requires 
police officers to obtain a warrant to perform blood tests on 
individuals suspected of DWIs11 because blood tests are “more 
intrusive” than breath tests and could be deemed reasonable by one 
person but not reasonable to another.12 
Section II will discuss the history of the Fourth Amendment 
and its requirements.  Section III will set forth the various exceptions 
to the warrant requirement that are acceptable under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Section IV will analyze the Fourth Amendment’s 
impact on DWIs.  Section V will discuss the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Birchfield and its effect on searches and seizures under the Fourth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.13  Specifically, this section will 
argue that Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion in Birchfield was 
correct in warning that the Fourth Amendment will lose its meaning 
 
4 Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013). 
5 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2169 (2016). 
6 Id. at 2167. 
7 Amend IV Search and Seizure, NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR., http://constitutioncenter.org/ 
interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-iv (last visited Feb. 9, 2016). 
8 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 
1.1(a) (5th ed. 2015).   
9 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016). 
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
12 Id. (holding that blood tests can only be performed in DWI cases when the police 
officer has a warrant).   
13 Id. at. 2160 (2016); U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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if the Court continues to rule in favor of warrantless searches.14  
Section VI will examine the corrosion of the Fourth Amendment and 
how its meaning has been diminished over time.  Overall, this Note 
will conclude that the Court’s ruling in Birchfield15 has created yet 
another unnecessary and questionable exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.  Additionally, the warrant 
requirement for a blood test, but not for a breath test, is confusing and 
misleading because both tests are related to DWI stops and both tests 
involve intrusions into an individual’s body.16 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
At the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, 
where the Constitution was originally ratified, the Constitution did 
not contain a Bill of Rights,17 and the Federalists and the Anti-
Federalists argued over its necessity.18  While the Federalists argued 
that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary “because the people and the 
states kept any powers not given to the federal government,”19 the 
Anti-Federalists, fearing a strong centralized government, argued that 
a Bill of Rights was crucial to guarantee “that the new government 
would not trample upon their newly won freedoms.”20  As such, 
President George Washington appointed James Madison, an Anti-
Federalist, to spearhead the writing of the Bill of Rights, which 
included the Fourth Amendment.21   
 
14 See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2187 (2016). 
15 Id. at 2160.  
16 Id.  
17 LaFave, supra note 8.   
18 Bill of Rights of the United States of America (1791), BILL OF RIGHTS INSTITUTE, 
https://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/bill-of-rights/ (last visited Feb. 14, 
2017).  
19 Id.  
20 The Bill of Rights: A Brief History, ALCU.ORG, https://www.aclu.org/other/bill-rights-
brief-history (last visited Oct. 17, 2016). 
21 LaFave, supra note 8; U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.”). 
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The Fourth Amendment is partly based on English law.22  The 
English maxim that “every man’s house is his castle” prevented the 
King’s sheriff from entering the home.23  However, the King’s agents 
could gain entry to the home if proper notice was provided,24  even 
though there was no specific formula to provide such notice.25  For 
example, in 1757, the Court of the King’s Bench in Curtis’ Case26 
instructed officers of the King’s Bench to kick down the door of a 
residence while trying to serve a warrant for arrest for breach of the 
peace after “having demanded admittance and giv[ing] due notice of 
their warrant.”27  There, the court held that it was enough that the 
defendant knew the officers were not coming into his home as 
trespassers but were instead acting in their authority under the law 
and the King’s orders to enter his residence.28  Learning from the 
experiences of the English and understanding the issues of the 
unclear English search and seizure procedures, the U.S. Founders 
knew they had to implement a proper warrant procedure for law 
enforcement officers to gain entry to a person’s home or to seize a 
person’s property.29 
The Fourth Amendment also grew out of the experiences of 
the colonists, who needed protection from the “writs of assistance,” 
which were “general warrants” allowing for British law 
enforcement’s entry into smugglers’ homes to remove prohibited 
goods.30  Additionally, British law enforcement entered homes and 
seized items from individuals “for the purpose of enforcing customs, 
duties, and other revenue-raising measures”31 under the Sugar Act of 
1764 and the Stamp Act.32  The colonists, furious over these 
measures, revolted by protesting these taxes as restrictions on their 
 
22 The Fourth Amendment 1199, GPO, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-
1992/pdf/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-5.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (citing 1 B. Schwartz, 
The Bill Of Rights: A Documentary History 199, 205–06 (1971). 
23 Id. (citing 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604)). 
24 Id.  
25 Mark Josephson, Note, Fourth Amendment—Must Police Knock and Announce 
Themselves before Kicking in the Door of a House, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1229, 
1236-37 (1996).  
26 Id. (citing 168 Eng. Rep. 67 (F.B. 1757)).  
27 Id. (quoting 168 Eng. Rep. at 68 (F.B. 1757)). 
28 Id.  
29 The Fourth Amendment, supra note 22. 
30 The Fourth Amendment, supra note 22, at 1199.  
31 ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 23 (2006).  
32 Id. 
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liberty.33  Ultimately, the use of “general warrants, writs of 
assistance, and the like to promote collection of government levies” 
came to a halt when the Bill of Rights was finally added to the 
Constitution in 1791.34   
Today, the Fourth Amendment allows for law enforcement 
officers to obtain a warrant35 to search a person, item, or place if 
there is probable cause that criminal activity is taking place.36  
Probable cause requires more than a “mere suspicion” by law 
enforcement.37  Since probable cause is not defined within the Fourth 
Amendment itself, the U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates38 
defined it as a “totality of the circumstances” that is “not technical” 
but based on “factual and practical considerations of everyday life on 
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”39  The 
Court also defined probable cause in United States v. Regan40 as “the 
level of suspicion necessary to justify intrusions by the government 
into a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”41  In other words, 
probable cause must be justified and is considered under the standard 
of an ordinary, reasonable person in light of the circumstances 
presented.  
In order to obtain a search warrant, law enforcement officers 
must explain to a judge or magistrate that there is probable cause to 
search or seize.42  Officers do not need to present evidence at this 
stage of the proceeding, but they must explain why they have 
probable cause either directly to the judge or magistrate or in the 
form of an affidavit.43  They must also describe in detail where the 
search will be conducted and what items (if any) they plan to seize.44  
However, if time does not allow for the officers to appear in court to 
 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 32. 
35 Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). (“[I]t is a basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law that searches and seizures…without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable.”). 
36 Id. at 584-85. 
37 Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fourth Amendment, 114 POL. SCI. Q., 93 (1999).   
38 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983). 
39 Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). 
40 United States v. Regan, 281 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
41 Id.  
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obtain a warrant, a warrant can instead be issued over the phone.45  In 
circumstances where there is no time to obtain even a telephonic 
warrant, officers may also search or seize in accordance with one of 
the exceptions permitted under the Fourth Amendment as described 
below in Section III.46  
Sometimes, when unlawful searches and seizures occur under 
the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule will come into play. 
The exclusionary rule disposes of improperly obtained evidence 
under a faulty search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.47  It is 
a “judicially created” rule that “safeguard[s] Fourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent effect”48  because evidence that 
is discovered illegally is known as “fruit of the poisonous tree” and 
will be excluded at trial.49  For example, in Weeks v. United States,50 
the Supreme Court excluded letters and paperwork that were taken 
from the defendant’s home without a warrant because they were 
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.51  This rule, 
however, is not automatically applied when a violation of a person’s 
Fourth Amendment rights occurs52 and is instead used only when its 
deterrent effect will “outweigh the cost” of losing the wrongfully 
obtained evidence.53  For example, if a “police officer, on a sheer 
hunch, unconstitutionally searches defendant’s house for evidence of 
a possible murder” and finds a diary which “names a witness to the 
murder, who agrees to testify at trial,” that evidence and possible 
testimony will be excluded because the officer did not have a warrant 
to enter the house or obtain that diary.54  The exclusionary rule may 
result in the possibility that guilty defendants could go free due to a 
 
45 Id. (complying with FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.1 (2011) which describes telephonic procedures).  
46 See infra Section III.  
47 Exclusionary Rule, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ 
exclusionary_rule (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).  
48 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (citing United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).  
49 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). 
50 232 U.S. 383, 395 (1914). In this case, the police asked a neighbor where the defendant 
left his spare key to his Kansas City, Missouri home, found the spare key, and entered the 
defendant’s home without a warrant.  While inside, the police searched the home and seized 
various papers.   
51 Id. at 398. 
52 Id. at 392. 
53 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976). 
54 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION 383 (5th ed. 2010). 
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faulty search or seizure.55  Therefore, law enforcement officers need 
to proceed with caution and should obtain proper warrants to ensure 
that the evidence they collect will not be excluded at trial.  
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Even though the Constitution is the law of the land, there are 
seven main exceptions to the Fourth Amendment rule that a law 
enforcement officer must first obtain a warrant before searching or 
seizing someone’s person or property.56  These seven exceptions are: 
1) the search is incident to a lawful arrest; 2) consent; 3) plain view; 
4) turning over an item to the police voluntarily; 5) search of a car 
that could easily be moved; 6) search of an impounded vehicle in 
police custody; and 7) the presence of exigent circumstances.57  Other 
common warrantless searches include searches of luggage and 
persons at airports, border control searches, and stop and frisks,58 
which are permissible for security purposes.59  All of these 
exceptions are judicially created to ensure that the law and individual 
rights are balanced against unreasonable searches and seizures.60 
 
55 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009). 
56 See Investigations: Seven exceptions to the search warrant rule, LAWOFFICER.COM, 
http://lawofficer.com/2008/05/investigations-seven-exceptions-to-the-search-warrant-rule/ 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2016).  
57 Id.; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 218 (1973) (holding that “[i]n the case of 
a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that 
Amendment.”); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 128 (1990) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment “does not prohibit the warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view even though 
the discovery of the evidence was not inadvertent. Although inadvertence is a characteristic 
of most legitimate plain-view seizures, it is not a necessary condition.”); S. Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 364 (1976) (holding that an inventory search of a car that was 
impounded by police did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (holding that since a vehicle is moveable and defendant can drive away 
and destroy evidence, an officer can search the vehicle without a warrant to ensure that 
evidence will not be destroyed).  
58 Search and Seizure: The Meaning of the Fourth Amendment Today, 
SOCIALSTUDIES.ORG, 
http://www.socialstudies.org/system/files/publications/se/6105/610507.html (last visited Oct. 
17, 2016).  
59 Jack Doyle, Airport luggage spies: How officials are rummaging through your bags 
without telling you, DAILY MAIL, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2596433/Airport-
luggage-spies-How-officials-rummaging-bags-without-telling-you.html (last updated April 
3, 2014).  
60 Search and Seizure: The Meaning of the Fourth Amendment Today, supra note 58. 
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However, the Supreme Court cautions that exceptions to the 
warrant requirement are few and far between “and that the police 
bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need 
that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.”61  Exceptions to 
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment should only be 
applied when an officer reasonably believes that time does not allow 
for a warrant or that obtaining a warrant would substantially interfere 
with the investigation at hand.  This is because warrantless searches 
and seizures are considered per se unreasonable unless one of the 
accepted exceptions applies.62  
One of the most noteworthy exceptions to the warrant 
requirement is exigency, which occurs when the “needs of law 
enforcement are so compelling that the warrantless search is 
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”63  A 
compelling reason for officers to enter a home, for example, is where 
there is a high likelihood that the residents will escape or resist 
arrest.64  In all cases involving exigent circumstances, officers must 
have a reasonable belief that there is an emergency situation at 
hand.65  Reasonableness requires only “sufficient probability, not 
certainty” under the Fourth Amendment.66   
Additionally, officers can conduct a warrantless search when 
they have probable cause and reasonably believe that inaction could 
result in the destruction of evidence.67  For example, the Supreme 
Court in Stacey v. Emery68 held that “if the facts and circumstances 
before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and 
caution in believing that the offence has been committed, it is 
sufficient.”69  In this case, Emery, a supervisor at the Internal 
Revenue Service, seized a bottle of whiskey that belonged to Stacey, 
an employee of the IRS.70  The Court agreed with Emery that this 
 
61 United States v. Caraballo, 831 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. Aug. 1, 2016) (quoting Harris v. 
O’Hare, 770 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 2014)).  
62 Scope of the Amendment, JUSTIA US LAW, 
http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-04/02-scope-of-the-amendment.html (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2017).  
63 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978). 
64 United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 1984).  
65 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).  
66 Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971).  
67 Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1575 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
68 97 U.S. 642 (1878). 
69 Id. at 645. 
70 Id.  
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was a proper seizure because Emery was an officer who seized the 
bottle as part of his assigned duties, and Stacey could have easily 
disposed of it.71  The Court further explained that malice is not an 
element of probable cause.72   
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND DWIS 
The Fourth Amendment is applicable in cases when an 
individual is stopped by the police for alleged intoxication.73  Drivers 
may face criminal penalties, such as jail time, fines, driver’s license 
suspension, driver’s license revocation, or interlock device 
installments, if they refuse breath or blood tests after being pulled 
over by law enforcement.74  For example, New York’s implied 
consent law states that drivers who fail to submit to chemical tests 
have their license suspended for one year and must pay a mandatory 
fine of $500 to the state.75  However, Arizona, which has the strictest 
DWI laws in the country, requires that first time DWI offenders have 
an interlock device installed in their cars and pay a mandatory 
minimum fine of $1,250.  Additionally, courts in Arizona have the 
discretion to require community service, suspend driver’s licenses for 
one year, and impose jail time up to ten days for first time 
offenders.76 
A driver who submits to a roadside Breathalyzer test may still 
be criminally charged if the BAC exceeds the legal limit of 0.08%.77  
For example, a driver who has a BAC of 0.16% or higher in North 
Dakota, which is double the legal limit, must spend two nights in jail 
in addition to a suspension of the driver’s license and a payment of a 
$750 fine.78  In New York, a driver who has a BAC of .18% or higher 
 
71 Id. 
72 Emery, 97 U.S. at 645.   
73 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2163 (2016). 
74 Betsy Simmons Hannibal, DUI: Refusal to Take a Field Test, or Blood, Breath or Urine 
Test, DRIVING LAWS BY NOLO, http://dui.drivinglaws.org/resources/dui-refusal-blood-breath-
urine-test.htm# (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).  
75 DMV Penalties for Alcohol or Drug-Related Violations, DMV.NY.GOV, 
https://dmv.ny.gov/tickets/penalties-alcohol-or-drug-related-violations (last visited Oct. 17, 
2016). 
76 Alina Comoreanu, Strictest and Most Lenient States on DUI, WALLETHUB (Aug. 10, 
2016), https://wallethub.com/edu/dui-penalties-by-state/13549/. 
77 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 39-08-01(1)(a) (2003).   
78 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 39–08–01(5)(a)(2) (2013).   
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must pay a mandatory fine ranging from $1,000-$2,000 dollars and 
can spend up to one year in jail.79  
The Supreme Court held in Schmerber v. California80 that 
“compelled intrusions into the body for blood to be analyzed for 
alcohol content,” as well as the use of one’s breath in a Breathalyzer 
test, fall within the confines of a search of one’s “person” under the 
language of the Fourth Amendment.81  Here, officers who responded 
to a car accident smelled alcohol on the driver’s breath and noted that 
his eyes appeared “bloodshot, watery…[and] glassy.”82  While the 
driver refused to submit to a blood test, the police officers 
nonetheless believed that a blood test had to be performed 
immediately because there were exigent circumstances83 that did not 
allow time for the officers to first obtain a warrant.84  The Court 
agreed, concluding that “the attempt to secure evidence of blood-
alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to the driver’s 
arrest”85 because:  
The percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to 
diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body 
functions to eliminate it from the system. Particularly 
in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to 
bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the 
scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a 
magistrate and secure a warrant.86 
The officers believed that without performing an immediate blood 
test, the driver’s blood alcohol levels could decrease over time and 
would therefore interfere with their investigation of the driver.87  As 
such, the officers in this case did not perform an unreasonable search 
because exigent circumstances were present, qualifying as an 
exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment.88  
 
79 DMV Penalties for Alcohol or Drug-Related Violations, supra note 75. 
80 384 U.S. 757 (1996). 
81 Id. at 768; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). 
82 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768. 
83 Id. at 759. 
84 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978). 
85 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.  
86 Id. at 770–71; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 623 
(1989) (“The burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose 
behind the search.”). 
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
10
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Besides the Fourth Amendment, DWI stops are also 
associated with implied consent laws.  New Jersey was the first state 
to enact DWI laws in 1906,89 which required not an exact percent of 
BAC but instead only outward manifestations, such as slurred speech 
and imbalance, to deem a driver to be intoxicated behind the wheel of 
a vehicle.90  Implied consent laws, which provide that all “motorists, 
as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to 
consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on 
suspicion of a drunk-driving offense,”91 were not widely enacted 
across the country until decades later in 1953 when New York92 
introduced the first implied consent law to “induce persons suspected 
of drunk driving to take a chemical test.”93  Essentially, New York’s 
implied consent law today states that when people use the roadways, 
they agree to follow the law and not drink and drive, and if for some 
reason they do drink and drive, they understand that there will be 
consequences for their actions.94  Implied consent laws are related to 
a driver’s loss of expectation of privacy while on the road95 and were 
enacted due to “the need to determine a driver’s blood alcohol 
content.”96  The Court held in United States v. Knotts97 that “a person 
travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.”98  In other words, drivers on the roads of any state must 
comply with that particular state’s implied consent laws because they 
forfeited their expectation of privacy as soon as they entered the 
roadways.99 
 
89 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2167 (2016). 
90 Id. 
91 Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013). 
92 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2169. 
93 Id.  
94 Implied Consent Refusal Impact, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADMIN. (Sept. 1991), https://ntl.bts.gov/lib/25000/25800/25898/DOT-HS-807-
765.pdf.  
95 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
96 Steven Oberman, Blood or Breath in Birchfield: The Supreme Court Draws A Critical 
Distinction, 40 CHAMPION 47, 47 (2016).  
97 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
98 Id. at 281. 
99 Id.  
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V. BIRCHFIELD CASE 
The Supreme Court held in Birchfield, in a 5-3 decision, that a 
warrant must be obtained prior to drawing someone’s blood in a DWI 
case,100  consolidating three separate lower court cases into one 
ruling.101  Even though the defendant in each case refused either a 
blood or breath test, they were all nonetheless arrested for driving 
while intoxicated102 and argued that the Fourth Amendment required 
a warrant in each of their circumstances.103  The Supreme Court 
distinguished between breath tests and blood tests and held that 
because a blood test is more intrusive than a Breathalyzer test, a 
warrant is required for a blood test of a DWI offender.104   
In the first lower court case, Danny Birchfield (“Birchfield”) 
drove his car off the road in North Dakota in October 2013.105  A 
trooper witnessed Birchfield attempting to back out of a ditch off the 
side of the highway, and upon approaching him to investigate what 
happened, the trooper smelled a strong odor of alcohol.106  The 
officer asked Birchfield if he would consent to a “roadside breath 
test” and Birchfield complied.107  This breath test indicated that 
Birchfield’s BAC was 0.254%, “more than three times the legal limit 
of 0.08%.”108  However, because Birchfield later refused a blood test, 
he was then charged with a class B misdemeanor under a North 
Dakota statute for his refusal to submit to this chemical testing.109  
Birchfield argued that the North Dakota statute charging him with 
this misdemeanor110 was unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because the officers did not 
have a warrant to administer a blood test, which led him to believe he 
was not required to give his blood at all.111  The North Dakota 
 
100 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185.  
101 Id. at 2170. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 2167. 
104 Id. at 2184. 
105 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct at 2170.  
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 39-08-01(1)(a) (2003) (stating that individuals cannot 
operate vehicles with an alcohol concentration of .08%).   
109 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2170.  
110 Id.  
111 State v. Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d 302, 303 (N.D. 2015).  
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Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the statute did not violate 
Birchfield’s Fourth Amendment rights because the police officer had 
probable cause to believe that Birchfield was intoxicated and that 
Birchfield did not comply with implied consent laws.112  Therefore, 
he was required by state law to submit to blood testing or else face 
criminal penalties.113 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the North Dakota Supreme 
Court’s decision, holding that a warrantless blood test is 
unconstitutional because it is intrusive upon a person’s body114 and as 
such, the “search [Birchfield] refused cannot be justified as a search 
incident to his arrest or on the basis of implied consent.”115  While the 
Court listed various advantages of blood tests, such as their capacity 
to reveal other illegal substances in a driver’s system that could have 
impaired him at the time of arrest,116 the Court ultimately reasoned 
that the intrusive nature of blood tests outweighs their benefit.117  
Therefore, a warrant is required to draw blood.118 
In the second lower court case, William Robert Bernard, Jr. 
(“Bernard”) was arrested for driving while intoxicated after the 
Minnesota police found him in his underwear and smelling of alcohol 
with two other men attempting to tow a boat out of the Mississippi 
River with his pick-up truck.119  Bernard admitted to drinking that 
night but denied driving the pick-up truck, even though the police 
found him with the keys to the pick-up truck in his hand.120  Bernard 
also refused field sobriety testing at the scene and later refused a 
breath test at the police station after he was arrested.121  Due to this 
double refusal, officers charged him with refusal in the first degree, 
which carried up to a three-year prison sentence, because “he had 
four prior impaired-driving convictions” at the time of this particular 
arrest.122  Bernard argued that the Minnesota refusal law was 
 
112 Id. at 309-10.  
113 Id. 
114 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2187.  
115 Id. at 2165. 
116 Id. at 2184. 
117 Id. at 2185.  
118 Id. 
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unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.123  The Minnesota 
trial court dismissed the charges, thereby agreeing with Bernard that 
requiring a warrantless breath test is prohibited under the Fourth 
Amendment.124  However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed 
and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the police 
did not need a warrant to perform a breath test on a suspected drunk 
driver such as Bernard.125 
Unlike in Birchfield’s case, the Supreme Court upheld 
Bernard’s charges because the Court ruled that the Fourth 
Amendment did not require a warrant for a breath test.126  
Specifically, the Court held that “the Fourth Amendment did not 
require officers to obtain a warrant prior to demanding the test, and 
Bernard had no right to refuse it” because a search warrant is not 
required when the test was administered incident to an arrest for 
drunk driving.127  A warrant is not required incident to arrest because 
“the state is justifiably concerned that evidence [the BAC level] may 
be lost” over time.128  Therefore, Bernard’s criminal prosecution was 
constitutional. 
In the third lower court case, Steve Michael Beylund 
(“Beylund”), unlike the other defendants, consented to a blood test 
after he was arrested for driving while impaired in North Dakota 
because the police told him that this test was required by law.129  
Here, the police witnessed Beylund hit a stop sign while attempting 
to pull into a driveway.130  When the officer approached the vehicle, 
he found an empty wine glass, smelled alcohol coming from inside 
the vehicle, and noticed that Beylund was unsteady on his feet when 
he got out of the car to perform field sobriety tests.131  His consented-
to blood test revealed that he had a BAC of 0.25% (more than three 
times the legal limit of 0.08%).132  After a hearing before the 
Department of Transportation, where the arresting officer testified 
 
123 Id. 
124 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2171. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 2186. 
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 2165. This holding is consistent with the Court’s ruling in Schmerber v. 
California. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1996). 
129 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2186. 
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that he reasonably believed that Beylund was intoxicated, Beylund’s 
driver’s license was suspended for two years.133  Beylund argued that 
taking the blood test without a warrant, even with his consent, 
violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment 
because he was coerced into submitting to the blood test by the police 
officers who told him that refusal itself was still considered to be a 
crime.134  Beylund appealed his case to the North Dakota Supreme 
Court, which upheld the lower court’s decision.135  
The U.S. Supreme Court again held that an officer must first 
obtain a search warrant in order to perform a blood test on a 
suspected drunk driver.136  Because voluntariness of consent to a 
search must be “determined from the totality of all the 
circumstances,” the Court remanded this case to the lower court to 
determine if Beylund was wrongfully coerced into consenting to the 
test.137  The Court relied on its 1973 decision in Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte,138 in which it held that when a police officer attempts to 
justify a warrantless search on the basis of consent, “the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent 
was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, 
express or implied.”139  It clarified that: 
Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined 
from all the circumstances, and while the subject’s 
knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken 
into account, the prosecution is not required to 
demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to 
establishing a voluntary consent.140 
Not all nine justices agreed that the holding in Birchfield case 
was proper.141  Justice Thomas in his partial dissent argued that “both 
warrantless breath and blood tests are constitutional”142 because he 
believed that exigency is present when the body’s “natural 
 
133 Id.  
134 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2172.  
135 Id. at 2186. 
136 Id. at 2184.  
137 Id. at 2186; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 218 (1973).  
138 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 218 (1973).  
139 Id. at 248. 
140 Id.  
141 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2198 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
142 Id. 
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metabolism” will start to break down the alcohol in the blood almost 
immediately and destroy the evidence of the crime unless an urgent 
breath or blood test is taken.143  Additionally, he believed that the 
warrant requirements for blood and breath tests should bypass the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment because the Court’s 
“hairsplitting [between blood and breath tests] ma[de] little sense.”144  
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined, 
dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that law enforcement 
officers are required to obtain a warrants for both breath tests and 
blood tests during a DWI traffic stop.145  Justice Sotomayor believed 
that the exceptions to the warrant requirement should be limited, 
especially in cases involving DWIs,146 because “if the Court 
continues down this road, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement will become nothing more than a suggestion.”147 She 
also asserted that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, 
particularly pertaining to DWI cases, should be upheld to prevent 
weakening of its effect on society and the criminal justice system as a 
whole and argued that it is not impracticable for law enforcement 
officers to secure a warrant before administering a breath test to a 
driver.148 
Justice Sotomayor also noted that there are various delays 
built into the breath and blood test process in order to give law 
enforcement officers time to obtain warrants in accordance with the 
Fourth Amendment.149  She first clarified that DWI stops are 
different from those portrayed in the movies and on TV because 
drivers, in real life, are not pulled over and then immediately forced 
to submit to Breathalyzer tests on the side of the road.150  The 
“standard evidentiary breath test” actually used is typically given 
after the driver has been arrested and taken back to the police station 
where officers can use more reliable and accurate machinery rather 
 
143 Id. (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1576 (2013)). 
144 Id. at 2197. Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg agreed with Justice Thomas that blood 
and breath tests should be treated alike.  However, Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg argued 
that both tests should require warrants under the Fourth Amendment, whereas Justice 
Thomas argued that both tests should not require warrants.  
145 Id. at 2187 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
146 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2187.  
147 Id. at 2196.  
148 Id. at 2191. 
149 Id.  
150 Id. at 2192.  
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than when the driver is first pulled over.151  This creates a great delay 
in discovering whether the driver was driving while intoxicated, 
especially if the driver’s BAC level is right at the .08 mark, and the 
alcohol could leave his system before he arrives at the police 
station.152  Additionally, some states require the driver to be given a 
fifteen to twenty minute window for “residual mouth alcohol” to 
wear off.153  Residual mouth alcohol is alcohol that is still present in 
the mouth and can possibly lead to an increased BAC reading when a 
breath test is performed.154  There are other states that require a 
suspected drunk driver be given a period of time to contact a lawyer 
before taking a breath test.155   Finally, instances may arise in which 
it can take up to a half hour for a breath test machine to “warm up” if 
it is not already on when the driver arrives at the police station.156  In 
the case involving defendant Birchfield, the officers had a two-hour 
window to obtain a warrant from a judge between pulling over the 
driver for a suspected DWI and actually administering the breath 
test.157  Justice Sotomayor, in pointing to all of these various delays, 
argued that law enforcement officers have adequate time to obtain 
proper warrants for breath tests in accordance with the Fourth 
Amendment.158  
Justice Sotomayor also argued that the refusal rate in today’s 
society is so low that obtaining a warrant rarely ever needs to happen 
in the first place.159  In North Dakota, for example, only 21% of 
drivers refuse breath tests, while the refusal rate in Minnesota is even 
less—only 12%.160   Even if the refusal rates in each of these states 
doubled, the judges and magistrates in those states would only have 
to issue one extra warrant per week for DWI-related cases.161  
 
151 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2192. The majority neither discussed nor disputed Justice 
Sotomayor’s information here.  
152 Id. 
153 Id.  
154 Id.  
155 Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
156 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2192.  For example, in North Dakota, the Intoxilyzer 8000 
machine takes a half hour to initialize before use.  
157 Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. § 39-20-04.1(1) (2008)).  
158 Id.  
159 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2193; see infra Section III (stating that consent is an exception 
to the warrant requirement). 
160 Id. In 2011, California had the lowest breath test refusal rate of 4%.  On the other end 
of the spectrum, Florida had a refusal rate of 82%. Namuswe ET AL., supra note 3.  
161 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2194.   
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Essentially, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the judicial system 
would not be overrun with warrant requests by simply adding one 
more warrant per week to a judge’s already busy calendar.162  
Finally, Justice Sotomayor argued that once a driver is 
arrested for suspected drunk driving, that driver is taken off the street 
and no longer poses a threat to other drivers on the road.163  
Therefore, even if it takes some time to obtain a warrant, at least the 
government’s interest in “protecting the public” from dangerous 
drunk drivers is already satisfied.164  The majority specifically 
responded to this point by arguing that the government’s interest 
reaches beyond protecting the public from this particular driver but 
also deters drivers from drinking and then getting behind the wheel in 
the first place.165  In fact, law enforcement officers frequently set up 
sobriety checkpoints on the roadside to deter drivers from drinking 
and driving.166 
VI. SLIPPERY SLOPE 
As Justice Sotomayor stated in her persuasive dissent, if the 
Court continues to gloss over its requirements, the Fourth 
Amendment will become “an empty promise of protecting citizens 
from unreasonable searches.”167  She argued that the Fourth 
Amendment will become a mere suggestion and could eventually 
become obsolete.168  Justice Sotomayor dissented on another Fourth 
Amendment issue in 2016 in Utah v. Strieff,169 which was decided 
less than two weeks before Birchfied.170  In Strieff, the defendant, 
Edward Strieff, was standing outside of his home in Salt Lake City 
when an officer stopped him, asked him some questions, and ran his 
license through a police database system.171  After checking his 
 
162 Id. (stating that the Supreme Court has never held that convenience of the courts is an 
exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment).  
163 Id. at 2191.  
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 2178.  
166 Michael F. Lotito, Comment, Unsteady on Its Feet: Sobriety Checkpoint 
Reasonableness, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 735, 757 (2010).  
167 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2195.   
168 Id. at 2196.  
169 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
170 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2160.   
171 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059. 
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license, he discovered that Strieff had a “small traffic warrant” 
outstanding in the system.172  The officer then searched Strieff’s 
person and found methamphetamine in his pocket.173  Strieff filed 
suit and the Utah Supreme Court held that the drugs were discovered 
based on an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment.174  
However, the Supreme Court reversed because the seizure was 
permissible due to the officer’s discovery of the outstanding warrant, 
which “attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop” and the 
drugs seized during the incident to arrest search.175  Justice 
Sotomayor dissented in this case arguing that an outstanding traffic 
ticket, or other small infraction, does not open the door for officers to 
search a person for no reason.176   
Furthermore, in her dissent in Strieff, Justice Sotomayor 
argued that “the mere existence of a warrant not only gives an officer 
legal cause to arrest and search a person, it also forgives an officer 
who, with no knowledge of the warrant at all, unlawfully stops that 
person on a whim or hunch.”177  She reasoned that “two wrongs do 
not make a right” and that charging an individual for a crime while 
violating that individual’s Fourth Amendment rights was 
unacceptable.178  Justice Sotomayor also argued that the exclusionary 
rule should have protected the illegally obtained evidence from being 
used against the defendant,179 whereas in Birchfield, she argued that 
the seizure never should have occurred and thus did not make an 
exclusionary rule argument at all.180  Similar to her arguments in 
Strieff, Justice Sotomayor contended in Birchfield that the majority’s 
ruling diminished the integrity of the Fourth Amendment.181 
 Furthermore, Justice Thomas in his partial dissent in 
Birchfield argued that when the Court draws an “arbitrary line in the 
sand” between blood and breath tests in a DWI stop, it uses a case-
 
172 Id. at 2065. 
173 Id.  
174 Id.  
175 Id. at 2064.  
176 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064. 
177 Id. at 2067.  
178 Id. at 2065.  
179 Id. at 2064. The exclusionary rule would have prevented the illegally obtained objects 
from being used against the defendant; essentially those objects would have been thrown out, 
as if the police never found them.  
180 See generally Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2187.  
181 Id.  
19
Kassman: Driving While Intoxicated
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
1186 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
by-case test to determine what is and what is not too intrusive on a 
person’s Fourth Amendment rights, creating confusion in the judicial 
system.182  Both Justices Sotomayor and Thomas asserted that the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment holdings are inconsistent, thereby 
weakening the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.183  
Justices Thomas and Sotomayor are not alone in warning 
about the erosion of the Fourth Amendment.  In 2011, Justice 
Ginsburg dissented to the majority’s ruling in Kentucky v. King.184  In 
that case, the Court held that the police can knock down the door of a 
residence if they believe that evidence is in the process of being 
destroyed inside the home.185  However, Justice Ginsburg argued that 
the majority armed “the police with a way routinely to dishonor the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in drug cases.”186  Instead 
of presenting evidence to a neutral magistrate, the police “may now 
knock, listen, and then break the door down, even if they had ample 
time to obtain a warrant.”187  Justice Ginsburg’s argument pertaining 
to timing is consistent with Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in 
Birchfield.188  Justice Sotomayor argued that the arrest process during 
a DWI stop is intentionally detailed and time consuming so that 
officers have ample time to obtain a proper warrant.189  
Every dissenting justice in Birchfield agreed that the majority 
was wrong in holding that warrants are required for some DWI tests 
but not for others.190  The outcome of Birchfield weakens the 
integrity and meaning of the Fourth Amendment and creates 
confusion not only in the judicial system but also to individual police 
officers.191  The Fourth Amendment has many established exceptions 
to its warrant requirement and does not need another added exception 
for DWI purposes.  All DWI cases should be treated the same, and 
since the Court ruled that warrants are required for blood tests, then 
they should also be required for breath tests.   
 
182 Id. at 2198.  
183 Id.  
184 563 U.S. 452, 473 (2011).  
185 Id. at 472. 
186 Id.  
187 Id.  
188 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2195 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
189 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2192 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
190 Id.  
191 Id. at 2198.  
20
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 19
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/19
2017 DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED 1187 
VII. CONCLUSION  
The Fourth Amendment’s purpose is to protect individuals 
from unreasonable searches and seizures and require warrants to be 
used in all circumstances unless there is an applicable exception.192  
However, the Supreme Court in Birchfield held that performing a 
breath test on a suspected drunk driver without a warrant is 
acceptable193 due to exigent circumstances.194  Conversely, the Court 
held that a warrant is still required for blood test purposes because it 
is more invasive than a breath test.195  By holding this way, the Court 
carved out a new exception to the warrant requirement under the 
Fourth Amendment.  As the list of exceptions to the warrant 
requirement is already a lengthy one, by adding the exception that a 
breath test does not require a warrant because it is not as invasive as a 
blood test, the Fourth Amendment is further losing its meaning and 
purpose. The exceptions to the Fourth Amendment seem to have 
“gobbled up the rule.”196   
The holding in Birchfield is a shocking one, and the dissenters 
had the stronger and more appealing arguments.197  Justice 
Sotomayor believed one of the reasons why the Court held that 
warrants were not required for breath tests was due to the 
administrative inconvenience it would place on judges across the 
country.198  If her belief was correct, then the majority had no legal 
basis for this argument because the Court has never held that “mere 
convenience” is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement.199  If the Court continues to hold this way in future 
cases, the Fourth Amendment will become obsolete.  
The dissenting Justices in Birchfield are not alone in their 
stance that the Fourth Amendment will continue to be downplayed by 
both law enforcement officials and the justice system if the Court 
continues to send mixed messages about the Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement, as other Justices have voiced their opinions in 
 
192 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
193 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2162. 
194 Id. at 2173.  
195 Id. at 2184. 
196 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION 163 (5th ed. 2010). 
197 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2187 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
198 Id. at 2194.  
199 Id.  
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past decisions as well.200  Overall, however, the majority of the Court 
believes that the Fourth Amendment is fluid in nature and can be 
manipulated as the Court sees fit.201  Even though the Constitution is 
a living document, it does not mean that the Court can dismiss parts 
of it whenever it wants.202  The Court needs to balance the 
Constitution’s malleable terms as well as preserving its meaning and 
history that the Framers intended in order to maintain the 
Constitution’s history and integrity.     
Because of Birchfield, the states are now “tasked with 
implementing creative and effective solutions to the ongoing issue of 
drunk driving while remaining within the bounds of the 
Constitution.”203  This means that police officers not only need to be 
informed of the changes in the law requiring a warrant for a blood 
test related to a DWI but also need to be better trained on the matter 
as a whole.204  As such, Birchfield has a powerful impact on police 
officers, judges, and drivers across the United States.205  The next 
time individuals get behind the wheel, they should know not to drink 
and drive, and if they do, they should remember that the officer 
inquiring into their sobriety needs a warrant to get a blood sample, 
but no warrant for a breath test. 206 
 
 
200 See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
201 See generally Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2163. 
202 See generally David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/fall10/strauss (last visited Feb. 
20, 2017).  
203 Megan Gordon, Comment, Blood and Breath Tests-Constitutional Law: 
Constitutionality of Warrantless Blood and Breath Tests Incident to DUI Arrest: Impact on 
Drunk Driving in North Dakota Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), 92 N.D. 
L. REV. 197, 210 (2016). 
204 See generally Michael P. Rellahan & Ginger Rae Dunbar, Police in Pennsylvania, 
Region Adjust to New DUI Rules, THE DELAWARE COUNTY DAILY TIMES (Jul. 3, 2016), 
http://www.delcotimes.com/article/DC/20160703/NEWS/160709908. 
205 Id.  
206 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. 2163 (2016). 
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